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Review
Kant's Political Theory: Interpretations and
Applications
Elisabeth Ellis (ed). University Park: Penn State University Press,
2012. 256pp.

Alice Pinheiro Walla*
For a long time in Anglo-American political philosophy “Kant’s political philosophy”
meant not Kant’s own developed political thought, but an application of his moral theory
to political issues. Thankfully, Kant’s legal and political thought is experiencing a
renaissance in the English-speaking world after a long period of neglect. Not only Kant’s
short political writings such as Toward Perpetual Peace, “On The Common Saying: This
May be True in Theory but it Does Not Hold in Practice,” and “An Answer to the
Question: What is Enlightenment” are being rediscovered; also the Doctrine of Right, the
first part of the Metaphysics of Morals of 1797 and a notoriously difficult work not least
due to editorial complications in Kant’s time, is receiving growing attention in the AngloAmerican Kant scholarship. Elisabeth Ellis’ volume is a fine example of this
development.
Despite the title (Kant’s Political Theory), the volume also focuses on themes of
Kant’s legal thought, and not only on his political theory (in fact, the political aspects of
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Kant’s theory are hard to keep apart from his legal philosophy). Ellis’ anthology brings
together analyses of central themes of Kant’s legal and political philosophy as well as
less explored specialized themes such as Kant’s views on education, freedom of speech,
and intellectual property. One of the strengths of the volume is its well-balanced
combination of interpretative Kant scholarship with historical analyses. As some of the
articles show, it is often this historical awareness that enables a new understanding of
Kant’s texts, away from mainstream interpretations.
In her essay, Onora O’Neill questions whether Kant can be considered a social
contract theorist. She spells out the connection between the idea of a social contract and
Kant’s universal principle of right and argues that consent must be understood as a modal
requirement that a law or policy must fulfill. It is neither the actual consent nor the
hypothetical consent of idealized rational beings: the criterion is instead the possibility of
universal consent. A constitution reflects the social contract if it could be consented to.
Because this criterion seems too minimal for deriving any concrete requirements, O’Neill
goes on to show how possible consent has nevertheless substantive implications:
If the idea of social contract is that of a constitution that could
secure universal consent, then any constitution that exemplifies it must
require the freedom of individuals, without which the possibility of
genuine consent or dissent is undermined, at least for some, and
universal consent becomes impossible. Second, it requires their
common dependence on or subordination to law: if anyone were above
or outside the law…the possibility of genuine consent or dissent is
undermined, at least for some, and universal consent becomes
impossible. Third, it must endorse the legal equality of citizens, since
the subordination of some individuals to others…would once again
undercut freedom, and with it the possibility of genuine consent and
dissent (…). (33)
O’Neill seems to be equivocating on the notion of possible consent: not as
logically possible consent, as she seemed to suggest at first but as consent that can be
achieved or “made possible.” She, therefore, confuses what one could in principle
consent to with the conditions for enabling actual consent.
O’Neill’s interpretation of the role of coercion in Kant’s Doctrine of Right is
also problematic. She argues that right “might or might not require coercive powers” and
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that the need for coercion is a remedial measure given the limitations of human nature “in
our world” (37). The idea that right is necessary regardless of human nature is correctly
stressed in Arthur Ripstein’s essay. This essay provides an excellent reconstruction of the
main tenets of Kant’s legal philosophy in the Doctrine of Right and addresses some
common misunderstandings of the theory. Ripstein also explains why Kant would not
have objected to resistance against the Nazi government despite his notorious rejection of
a right to revolution. As opposed to despotic governments which regardless of their
imperfections could still count as a defective version of a general will, the Nazi
government is barbaric, that is, as the mere employment of force without law and
freedom, a condition even more defective than the state of nature. Therefore, to resist
barbarism with the aim of establishing a proper civil condition amounts to doing right (if
not one’s positive duty). Ripstein’s argument is based on the distinction between the state
of nature and a barbaric pseudo government. However, this distinction is not required for
his argument. The state of nature is a condition in which there can be only unilateral
coercion, whether it is a peaceful or a violent state, due to the lack of an omnilateral
condition of public justice, that is, a government that can represent its people. While the
status naturalis is an idea of reason and might never have historically existed, barbarism
can be understood as a concrete situation of lawlessness, that is, a historically given
violent state of nature.
Thomas W. Pogge’s influential 1998 article reprinted in the volume discusses
the relation between Kant’s Doctrine of Right and Kant’s moral theory. Using Rawls’
distinction between a free standing theory and comprehensive doctrines, Pogge argues
(against Rawls) that Kant’s legal theory is in fact a free-standing liberal theory. While
Kant’s moral theory entails the Doctrine of Right as the only possible legal theory
compatible with transcendental idealism and critical philosophy, the Doctrine of Right
can nevertheless stand independently of Kant’s moral theory, despite Kant’s own
suggestions of the contrary. Although appealing, Pogge’s interpretation has some internal
difficulties which need to be solved if the independence thesis is to be made plausible.
As Pogge puts it, Kant teaches us the rules of the Rechtslehre game, that is,
which conduct options or “moves” are permissible and which are not. However, Pogge
thinks that Kant still needs to give us a reason “for paying any attention to these norms”
(86). Pogge then offers a prudential argument why “persons tend to benefit on balance
from the existence of a juridical condition” (ibid.). Although this might be true, the
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problem is that prudential reasoning cannot account for the duty to leave the state of
nature. Kant’s own argument relies in the recognition that to remain in the state of nature
is to wrong others in the utmost degree. The problem with the lawless state of nature is,
therefore, not merely a prudential problem.
Further, as Pogge recognizes, Kant’s assumption that domains of external
freedom must be equal seems hard to justify independently of his moral theory. If we
accept the independence thesis, Kant would seem to be smuggling equality through the
back door, “either by equivocating on the word ‘universal’ or by illicitly appealing to
morality while pretending not to do so” (92). Pogge looks for a possible argument in the
principle of publicity of Perpetual Peace, but ignores that a possible answer can be found
in the Doctrine of Right. The problem of right starts with a plurality of individuals who
must share the surface of the earth and whose agency is necessarily interconnected. The
legal starting point of the Rechtslehre game is thus automatically a situation of equality:
the equal claims to all individuals to a place on the earth, as formulated in Kant’s notion
of an original common possession of the earth (ursprünglicher Gemeinschaft des Bodens,
RL VI: 262).
Louis-Philippe Hodgson defends the “extreme” view that Kant’s political
thought commits us to the realization of a federal world state with coercive powers. In
contrast to Michaele Ferguson, who argues that the social unsociability characteristic of
our humanity paradoxically prevents the full realization of our humanity (164), Hodgson
believes that one can fully realize the ideal set by external freedom in this world (128).
Hodgson’s argument is based on the assumption “that states are entitled not to depend on
one another’s choices” (109) and that it is unproblematic to extend the right to coerce at
individual level to the international domain, an assumption which Kant himself was
reluctant to endorse. While the world state seems to be the natural conclusion to adopt,
given what Kant has to say about the possibility of peremptory right, it would be valuable
to take Kant’s reluctance more seriously. Why did he not commit himself openly to the
world state? This question, however, is set aside in the article.
Robert S. Taylor provides an interpretation of Kant’s An Answer to the
Question: What is Enlightenment as a key to understanding Kant’s “theory of enlightened
absolutism.” As he argues, although freedom of speech can be seen as in the short-term
interest of the enlightened monarch, the limitations imposed on free speech, while
initially protecting the “seed” of intellectual self-government, will ultimately undermine
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absolutism and pave the way towards a republican government. According to Taylor,
Kant’s main concern was to show that such a development towards self-government is
possible without violations of right or revolutions. Also related to the question of
intellectual freedom, John Christian Laursen’s essay situates Kant’s views on book piracy
within the debate on intellectual property in the eighteenth century and explains why
Kant did not make an explicit point in favor of freedom of the press, as he does for the
contractual relations threatened by book piracy. The point for freedom of the press and
thought is implicit in Kant’s innate right.
Ian Hunter refutes the widely accepted view according to which the censorship
of Kant’s writings on religion amounted to an anti-Enlightenment attitude from the
Prussian state. This essay provides a careful reconstruction of the historical philosophical
background in which Kant’s writings were embedded and provides a warning against
reading Kant solely “from Kant’s own perspective”. However Hunter’s reduction of
Kant’s thought to an attempt to reproduce Kant’s own philosophical “persona” is
surprising. This view does not take into account how Kant’s critical philosophy, which
pervades the entire Kantian system, evolved from a rejection of Leibniz-Wollffian
rationalism and underwent a long period of revisions in order to become internally
consistent. To reduce Kant’s thought to the reproduction of his “persona” is thus to
ignore the theoretical commitments of the critical project itself, which ultimately shaped
Kant’s political project.
As Mika LaVaque-Manty argues, education plays an important role in enabling
persons to behave well in society and setting themselves ends in general. Kant rightly
recognized the importance of education, including physical education. Although
instructive, LaVaque-Manty’s essay “Kant and Education” conflates Kant’s notion of
autonomy as self-legislation (Selbstgesetzgebung) with an empirical notion of autonomy
as giving oneself directives, such as moving one’s own body. The latter kind of autonomy
is the one furthered by education. While empirical autonomy can in fact facilitate or
come to bear on the exercise of moral autonomy, it is by no means responsible for the
development of moral autonomy as a rational capacity in the first place.
Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications is a useful and thought
provoking read, no less for the proposed interpretations than for the applications of
Kant’s theory. It is a welcome addition to the growing secondary literature on Kant’s
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legal philosophy. Its articles will certainly stimulate many further discussions on Kant’s
legal and political philosophy.

